

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR SURVEY
10 DECEMBER 1953

- 1 -

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Korea

KOREA: Limited Atrocity Comment Features Stereotyped Charges

There are 15 broadcasts on the atrocity charge raised in U.N. debate by the United States and comment reiterates the basic elements of the present Communist international propaganda position; Moscow denounces the American "slander" as a provocation aimed at inciting enmity for Korea and China, hampering peaceful adjustment of the Korean question and increasing world tension. Soviet countercharges consist largely of a rehash of standardized Communist charges of wanton American bombing of civilian targets--including the use of napalm and germ bombs--and the brutality used against Communist prisoners on Koje and Cheju. Moscow's limited and stereotyped response to the charges is in distinct contrast to Peking's voluminous and intense reaction.

Pillayev in a 6 December article in PRAVDA refers contemptuously to the U.N. resolution as "worth nothing" and he notes the lack of U.N. interest in the issue, particularly evident in the general Asian-Arab abstention in the final vote.

A 1 December commentary by Shestyuk, broadcast twice to the Home audience, apparently anticipating the U.N. discussion of atrocities, set a tone of unusual vehemence and excoriation not followed in the later comment. The commentator charges that the "U.S. man-haters" in Korea surpassed the monstrous cruelties inflicted on the world by Attila, Genghis Khan and Nazis such as Ilse Koch at the infamous death camps. Principal attention is devoted to American dissemination of deadly weapons in the guise of toys, which resulted in the death and mutilation of many Korean children. The commentator scores as an "abyss of cynicism" the plans of the United States troops in Korea to provide Christmas assistance for orphaned Korean children; the same American troops who committed "bloody brigandage" in Korea and orphaned the children.

Pact Comment Reiterates China's New Role: Moscow's reaction to the 23 November Sino-Korean pact is keynoted by a Shestyuk commentary of 25 November stressing both the security and political aspects of the pact as well as detailing Chinese economic assistance to Korea. The commentary, beamed twice to the Soviet domestic audience, appears to go out of its way to make its listeners aware of the extent of the Chinese aid and concomitantly to minimize the extent of Soviet assistance to Korea.

Soviet approval of the pact, voiced by Shestyuk, also takes the form of reiteration of China's new role as a "mighty stabilizing factor of peace in the Far East" and as a "new great power." Kudryavtsev on 6 December, perhaps in recognition of the increased role of China as a result of the pact, describes China as "a power of great political and economic might" and makes this an integral part of the previously quoted phrases. (Kudryavtsev also denounces the U.S. policies in regard to Formosa, admission of China to the U.N. and the economic blockage of the China mainland; issues which are still basically ignored by Peking.) Other Soviet attention to


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR SURVEY
10 DECEMBER 1953

NR



T
T
I

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR SURVEY
10 DECEMBER 1953

- 2 -

the Sino-Korean pact consisted of limited rebroadcasts of the joint communique and of speeches by Chou En-lai and Kim Il Sung at a subsequent banquet. These items were not broadcast to China, perhaps in deference to Peking's circumspect comment to its own domestic audience.* The first monitored reference to the extent of projected Chinese assistance to Korea in comment beamed to the Chinese domestic audience from either Peking or Moscow appears in a routine Moscow commentary on North Korean rehabilitation, broadcast on 4 December.

Moscow broadcasts no original comment on the Panmunjom negotiations, continuing to rely on NCNA releases.

NR


* See SURVEY of FAR EAST BROADCASTS, 3 December 1953 for a comparative review of pact comment from the principal transmitters.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR SURVEY
10 DECEMBER 1953

-3-



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~